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This paper investigates whether the aid allocation behavior of US Western allies during the Cold War 
reflected ideological motives. While there is extensive evidence on the ideological motivations 
underlying the US aid program during the Cold War, little is known about the behavior of western allies 
who often faced a trade-off between supporting the ideological struggle against the Eastern Bloc and 
penalizing authoritarian and corrupt regimes through their foreign aid policy. To this end, I extend the 
analysis of Berger et al (2013) by examining the impact of US and Soviet political influence in recipient 
countries on the aid allocation behavior of important Western donors over the period 1966-1989. The 
results suggest a great deal of variation in the extent to which aid allocation reflects ideological motives 
across Western allies: while Great Britain followed the US and fully embraced the ideological 
conditionality of foreign aid dictated by the logic of the Cold War, several other Western donors did not 
support developing countries on ideological grounds. 
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There is a consensus in the aid allocation literature that geopolitical and strategic motivations play an 
important role in bilateral donors’ choice of locations (e.g. Alesina and Dollar, 2000). The salience of 
geopolitical factors has been particularly strong during the Cold War (Fleck and Kilby, 2010, Bermeo, 
2017). Prior to 1990, the United States and the Soviet Union utilized bilateral foreign assistance 
primarily to buy and maintain influence in developing countries and to gain strategic advantages over 
the opposing side, regardless of populations’ actual needs and regimes’ human rights records. For 
instance, CIA-backed anti-communist dictators - such as Augusto Pinochet in Chile, Suharto in 
Indonesia and François “Papa Doc” Duvalier in Haiti - received substantial amounts of aid from the US 
despite repression of political rights and civil liberties, endemic corruption and human rights violations.  
In this context, US western allies often faced a trade-off between supporting the ideological struggle 
against the Eastern bloc and penalizing anti-democratic and corrupted governments through their foreign 
aid policy. This trade-off poses a particularly problematic dilemma for the group of “like-minded” 
countries that traditionally have been more altruistic, paying more attention to the respect of human 
rights and regarding poverty alleviation as the main goal of their aid allocation policy (Neumayer 
2003a).1 Yet, while there are numerous empirical studies that support the ideological conditionality of 
the U.S. aid program during the Cold War (e.g. Fleck and Kilby 2010, Berger et al. 2013), there is little 
evidence on how direct US (or Soviet) political influence in recipient countries affected bilateral aid 
allocation behavior of US western allies.  
Empirical studies that disaggregate across groups of donors and specifically focus on the Cold War 
period (e.g. Maizels and Nissanke, 1984, Boschini and Olofsgård, 2007), showed that some of the major 
NATO allies – particularly the “like-minded” group of donors - have generally been using bilateral aid 
less openly as an instrument of foreign policy than the US. A common feature of all these contributions 
is the use of donor’s military support as a proxy to capture the recipient country’s strategic and security 
importance. The presence and intensity of US military aid, however, are more subject to factors such as 
conflict situations and support to US troops and personnel, than to the ideological orientation of recipient 
governments. For example, while Pinochet’s authoritarian regime in Chile (1973-1990) was certainly 
anti-communist and under US influence, it formally received no military aid from the United States over 
the period 1976-1988.2 
This paper is the first contribution that separately analyzes for each major donor whether the 
ideological conditionality of foreign assistance played a significant role in the aid allocation behavior 
during the Cold War. Using data from Berger et al. (2013) on CIA and KGB interventions in developing 
countries, I explore empirically whether the aid allocation pattern of the five big donors – US, Great 
Britain, Germany, France, and Japan – and like-minded donors was affected by US or Soviet political 
influence in recipient countries. The results show that several western allies – namely Sweden, France, 
Norway, and the Netherlands - did not support developing countries on ideological grounds: they did 
not reward countries under US political influence nor did they penalize recipients close to the Eastern 
bloc. Interestingly, for some of these donors (including Canada), increased US political influence arising 
through CIA interventions during the Cold War was associated with lower aid commitments.  
                                                     
1 With like-minded donors Boschini and Olofsgård (2007) and Neumayer (2003b) refer to the group that includes Canada, 
Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.  
2 Data are from USAID and Berger et al. (2013). The list of recipient countries under US political influence that received no 
US Military Aid is reported in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
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Econometric Specification and Data 
The econometric analysis builds upon the gravity model specification proposed by Berger et al. (2013). 
The estimating equation is given by: 
 
𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑟,𝑡




The dependent variable is the bilateral volume of foreign aid commitments from a donor d to a recipient 
country r in a given year t. These data are obtained from the 2019 OECD-DAC dataset. The specification 
includes year 𝛼𝑡 and recipient 𝛼𝑟 fixed effects to isolate and better identify the effect of political 
influence. This parsimonious specification completely absorbs the effects of former colonial and cultural 
ties (e.g. language proximity) that were included in past studies. The equation also encompasses a set of 
time-varying recipient-specific controls 𝑿𝑟,𝑡 that are plausibly related to ODA allocation during the cold 
war period. These comprise the log of GDP per capita, an indicator for leader turnover, current leader 
tenure, a democracy indicator that proxies for the human rights record of recipient countries as well as 
bilateral imports, 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑟,𝑡
𝑑 , which are a proxy for the economic influence of donor countries (Berger at al. 
2013). The variables of interest are 𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟,𝑡 and 𝑅𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟,𝑡. These are equal to one if the 
recipient country r experienced CIA or KGB activities that were successful at either installing a new 
leader or in maintaining the power of an existing regime in year t, respectively.3 The model is separately 
estimated for each donor country for the period 1966-1989 using EK Tobit, which, according to Head 
and Mayer’s (2015) Monte-Carlo simulations, provides consistent estimates in the presence of a 
substantial share of zeros. Given the great deal of heterogeneity across donors both in terms of sample 
size and number of aid recipients, I restrict the empirical analysis to the groups of like-minded and big 
donors following the classification proposed by Neumayer (2003b).4  
Results  
Baseline results are reported in Table 1. In line with Berger et al. (2013), I find that ODA volumes from 
the US increased following CIA interventions and declined when the recipient was under Soviet 
influence. This finding confirms the ideological conditionality of US aid program during the Cold War 
that has been found in previous studies and suggests that US used foreign aid as a mean to maintain 
political and strategic alliances and to punish states that were seen to be too close to the other bloc. 
However, these geopolitical and ideological motivations related to the logic of the Cold War do not 
seem to affect the aid allocation pattern of most of the US western allies.  
As shown in Table 1, only two western donors other than the US increased foreign assistance 
following CIA interventions, and among these, only Great Britain fully embraced the ideological 
conditionality by penalizing recipients regarded to be too close to the Eastern bloc (Columns 1 and 2). 
On the contrary, four western allies - namely Sweden, France, the Netherlands, and Norway - did not 
support developing countries on ideological grounds in that they did not reward countries where the CIA 
installed and/or helped to maintain the power of incumbent anti-communist regimes. They also did not 
reduce ODA flows to recipient countries in which the KGB “successfully” intervened. Insofar as 
strategic interests played a role, these were mostly confined to bilateral commercial and economic ties, 
such as bilateral trade (Column 3).5 
                                                     
3 The definition of CIA interventions as well as the information on data sources are included in Berger et al. (2013).  
4 With respect to Neumayer (2003b) I exclude Italy from the group of big donors. 
5 As noted above, the impacts of historical relationships such as former colonial and cultural ties are completely absorbed by 
the set of fixed effects. 
Ideological Conditionality of Foreign Aid during the Cold War: Did Western Allies Follow the US? 
European University Institute 3 
For like-minded donors and France, altruistic motivations, proxied by the recipient’s per capita 
income, generally prevailed over the geopolitical motives behind the Cold War (Column 4). 
Interestingly, within this group of donors, Canada penalized developing countries under both Soviet and 
US political influence. These misalignments of Canadian and French aid policies with the US are not 
fully surprising as starting in the late 1960s both countries pursued an independent path in foreign policy 
and international relations. Conversely, Japan and West Germany, despite a close alliance with the 
United States during the entire cold war era, did not reward recipient countries under US influence.  
Table 1: Political Influence and Aid Allocation During the Cold War 




Imports Income  
 
Obs. Recipients Zeros 
        
Big Donors        
        
UNITED STATES 0.704** -2.657*** 0.192*** -1.440*** 2208 98 353 
 (2.89) (-6.60) (5.97) (-5.38)   (16%) 
        
JAPAN 0.188 -2.072*** 0.128*** -0.605** 2368 105 609 
 (0.92) (-5.01) (4.89) (-2.70)   (25.7%) 
        
GREAT BRITAIN 0.598*** -0.519* 0.0309 -0.121 2324 103 377 
 (3.68) (-2.18) (0.95) (-0.64)   (16.2%) 
        
FRANCE -0.940*** -0.384 0.324*** -0.616* 2368 105 897 
 (-3.45) (-0.84) (4.68) (-2.18)   (37.9%) 
        
GERMANY 0.0843 -0.629*** 0.0785*** -0.361* 2392 106 161 




       
SWEDEN -1.360*** -0.743 0.112*** -1.325** 2036 90 1270 
 (-4.07) (-1.50) (3.62) (-3.05)   (62.3%) 
        
NORWAY -0.540 -0.878 0.0939** -1.271** 2067 91 1240 
 (-1.48) (-1.80) (2.94) (-2.72)   (0.60%) 
        
NETHERLANDS 0.186 0.405 0.186*** -1.346*** 2325 103 665 
 (1.07) (1.29) (6.30) (-5.20)   (28,6%) 
        
CANADA -1.005*** -1.398*** 0.0653*** -1.101*** 2187 97 480 
 (-4.72) (-4.06) (4.83) (-4.34)   (21.9%) 
        
DENMARK 0.878* 0.601 0.187*** -2.711*** 2089 92 1,331 
 (1.96) (0.93) (3.77) (-5.40)   (63.7%) 
        
t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Notes: The dependent variable is bilateral ODA commitments in Millions 2016 Constant US Dollars at year t. The period under consideration 
is 1966-1989 and the estimates are obtained with EK Tobit. Robust standard errors are included. Singletons and observations separated by a 
fixed effect are dropped. All regressions include year and recipient fixed effects, an indicator for leader turnover, current leader tenure and a 
democracy indicator whose coefficients are not reported here, but are available upon request. Warsaw Pact members (under direct Soviet 
influence) are excluded from the sample as those countries received no (or limited) support from Western donors. Prior to 1976, OECD-DAC 
data on ODA committed to Vietnam refers to the flows towards Republic of Vietnam that was under US influence, while ODA committed to 
Yemen refers to the volumes towards Arab Republic of Yemen (North).  
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Table 2 tests the robustness of the reported results by estimating Equation (1) for the US with alternative 
gravity estimators. The results are qualitatively similar and point in the same direction as the benchmark 
estimates presented in Table (1).  
Table 2: Comparing Alternative Estimators 







Imports Income  
 
     
PPML 0.428** -1.806*** 0.646*** -1.844*** 
 (2.80) (-6.58) (7.19) (-5.77) 
     
OLS (1 + Aid) 0.968** -4.215** 0.239*** -1.757*** 
 (1.93) (-5.06) (4.91) (-3.24) 
     
OLS 0.504** -1.639** 0.139*** -1.673*** 
 (2.81) (-5.31) (4.59) (-7.39) 
t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
The dependent variables are 𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑟,𝑡
𝑑  for Poisson PML regression, ln(1 + 𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑟,𝑡
𝑑 ) and ln(𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑟,𝑡
𝑑 ) for the linear models (2nd and 3rd row, 
respectively). The regressions include the same set of controls of Table (1). Estimates for Donor countries other than the US are again in line 
with the EK Tobit counterparts and are available upon request.  
Concluding Remarks 
As concerns ideological conditionality of foreign aid during the cold war, there is not a single pattern 
across countries. Our results suggest that Great Britain was the only major western donor other than the 
United States that simultaneously rewarded developing countries under US influence and penalized 
recipients regarded as too close to the Eastern bloc. As for the other donors, the evidence suggests 
substantial heterogeneity in outcomes, indicating that ideological motivations did not seem to distinctly 
shape the pattern of aid allocation towards developing countries. In particular, like-minded countries 
together with France generally gave more weight to altruistic motivations and bilateral economic 
interactions in their allocation decisions than to ideological motives. These findings are in line with 
Boschini and Olofsgård (2007) and Maizels and Nissanke (1984), who observed important differences 
among donors’ aid allocation patterns during the Cold War.  
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Notes: data on US military Aid are from USAID while data on US influence (inclusive of onset and offset years) are from 
Berger et al (2013).  
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